Managerial Overconfidence and Deferred Tax Assets

Abstract

[Purpose] In this study, we examine how managerial overconfidence can influence the deferred tax assets reported in corporate financial statements. [Methodology] Using a sample of 5,208 firm－year observations listed in Korea from 2012 to 2020, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on deferred tax assets. Based on prior studies, we use and adopt three proxies to measure managerial overconfidence：Ahmed and Duellman (2013), Schrand and Zechman (2012), and Park and Kim (2020). To measure deferred tax assets, we hand－collect deferred tax assets information from tax footnotes in the financial statements. [Findings] We find that managerial overconfidence is positively associated with deferred tax assets. Results are robust when we control for industry, year and other variables that are known to influence deferred tax assets. In addition, we find that the relationship between managerial overconfidence and deferred tax assets is significantly attenuated in the presence of effective monitoring, such as foreign investors. [Implications] Consistent with prior studies, our findings suggest that managerial overconfidence influences financial reporting quality. In addition, our study provides important implications for investors. They should understand the level of managerial overconfidence to fully understand the tax behavior of the firms.