ScholarWorks@Gyeongsang National University: Lee, Eun Suh

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Lee, Eun Suh (이은서)

경영대학 (회계세무학부)

Research Area: 기업 지배구조, 은행, Q -방법론, Corporate Governance, Bank, Q- Methdology

Tel 0557721552
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CEO:4||이익조정:3||기업지배구조:2||CFO:2||Borrowing firms:2||주식보상유인:2||지속가능성:2||지정학적 위험:2||경영자의 과신성향:2||CEO power:2||Public Float:2||Excess Compensation:2||Earnings Management:2||Performance:2||외부 불확실성:2||원가의 하방경직성:2||external uncertainty:2||부동주:2||geopolitical risks:2||Cost Stickiness:2||Sustainability:2||Case Study:1||Cash Holdings:1||CoOpted Boards:1||Coopted boards:1||Communication:1||Companionship:1||Corporate Governance:1||Cost stickiness:1||Co－Opted Board:1||Culture:1||Directors:1||Earnings Smoothing:1||Earnings management:1||Economic Bonding Theory:1||Empathy:1||Equity Incentive:1||Financial Performance:1||Financial Reporting Quality:1||Financial performance:1||Firm Size:1||Gender differences:1||Governance Structures:1||Hypothesis Abduction:1||IPO:1||Interstate banking deregulation:1||Job satisfaction:1||Key Words: Happiness:1||K－IFRS:1||Learning styles:1||Learning tools:1||Livelihood Markets:1||Main bank:1||Main banks:1||Managerial Compensation:1||Managerial compensation:1||Managerial entrenchment hypothesis:1||Mexican managers:1||Monitoring Theory:1||Online education:1||Outside Directors:1||Overconfident Managers:1||Overconfident manager:1||Payforperformance sensitivity:1||Pay－Performance Sensitivity:1||Peer review:1||Positive Thinking:1||Postdoctoral bridge program:1||Proactive Board Behavior:1||Problemsolving:1||QMethodology:1||Qmethodology:1||Q방법론:1||Quiet life hypothesis:1||Q방법론:1||Reactive Board Behavior:1||Rubber－Stamp view:1||Scholarly academic:1||Small Daily Happiness:1||Social Enterprise:1||Social Management Control System:1||Social Value:1||Stewardship Theory:1||Subjectivity Study:1||Traditional Markets:1||Unique Culture:1||VARK:1||Voting rights:1||Writing circles:1||Writing skills:1||annual shareholder meeting:1||antitakeover provisions:1||asymmetric cost behaviors:1||board monitoring effectiveness:1||cooption:1||conservative earnings forecasts:1||corporate governance:1||corporate life cycle:1||cost stickiness:1||deferred tax assets:1||discretionary accruals:1||equity incentives:1||firm performance:1||individual analysts:1||investment inefficiency:1||managerial overconfidence:1||monitoring/advising view:1||politically connected outside directors:1||private benefits of control:1||risktaking incentives in executive compensation:1||share repurchase and disposal:1||가설발견:1||감사보수:1||감사품질:1||경영권방어수단:1||경영자 보상:1||경영자 보상차이:1||경영자보상:1||경영진 보상의 위험감수유인:1||고유문화:1||공감:1||관료출신 사외이사:1||긍정마인드:1||기업 지배구조:1||기업공개:1||기업규모:1||기업수명주기:1||기업의 재무성과:1||대리인 문제:1||대리인 이론:1||대출기업:1||동행:1||멕시코 경영자:1||모니터링 가설:1||문제해결:1||문화:1||발생액의 질:1||보수적 이익예측:1||비대칭적 원가행태:1||사례연구:1||사회적 가치:1||사회적MCS:1||사회적기업:1||생활시장:1||성과보상 민감도:1||성과－보상 민감도:1||성별차이:1||소통:1||소통시장:1||소확행:1||예산참여:1||은행차입금:1||이익침해가설:1||임원:1||재무분석가 예측정보:1||재무적성과:1||전통시장:1||주거래은행:1||주관성연구:1||직무 만족도:1||직무 성과:1||청지기 이론:1||초과보수:1||초도임원보수:1||코옵티드 이사:1||코옵티드 이사회:1||투자비효율성:1||하방경직성:1||한국채택국제회계기준:1||핵심어: 행복:1||현금 보유수준:1||AACSB accreditation:1||회계보수주의:1||Accessible Markets:1||Accounting Conservatism:1||Accounting education:1||Accounting faculty:1||Accounting major:1||Accruals Quality:1||Agency Problems:1||Agency Theory:1||Antitakeover Provision:1||Antitakeover provisions:1||Audit Fees:1||Audit Quality:1||Bank:1||Bank Debt Financing:1||Bank Loans:1||Banking competition:1||Board:1||Budget participation:1||CEO Pay Slice (CPS):1||CEO 영향력:1||

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