‘생활세계’의 윤리적 의미 - 후설, 가다머, 하버마스의 생활세계 -

초록

The purpose of this article is to elucidate the concepts of lifeworld of Husserl, Gadamer, and Habermas, while simultaneously deriving its ethical significance through comparison. Generally, the lifeworld, as the everyday world we experience in reality, has not received philosophical attention. This is because discourse in the lifeworld has remained at the level of opinion (doxa), cognition has been uncertain, and practice has been individualistic. Therefore, until Husserl highlighted the importance of the lifeworld in phenomenology, it was always considered incidental and secondary, a space from which to escape. Husserl, the first to thematize the lifeworld itself, emphasized its familiarity, its pre-existence, and its subject-connection. These characteristics of the lifeworld demonstrate to us that it is the source of meaning in human life. However, in order to overcome the relativity and diversity of the lifeworld, Husserl posits an idealized lifeworld corresponding to a transcendental cognition. Opposing this universal, a priori lifeworld, Gadamer argues for the lifeworld as a cultural and historical horizon, seeking to explore the possibility of understanding the world within a horizon composed of preconceptions and traditions. Gadamer's concept of horizon, even if our experience is merely an a transcendental conception of what is possible, reveals to us the lifeworld as an everyday world. In contrast, Habermas attempts to idealize the lifeworld once again to criticize the preconceived notions and structurally distorted ideologies within it. Habermas, who describes the colonization of the lifeworld by the system as a pathology of the lifeworld, seeks to protect the lifeworld from the system by relying on communicative rationality. However, I oppose the idealization of the lifeworld, recognizing it as a source of meaning and value and seeking to find its ethical significance.

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