Limitation of analogy in the Sleeping Beauty debate: the case of Singer's argument
- Kim, Namjoong
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- Sleeping Beauty; de se credence; Imprecise probabilism; Conditionalization
- SYNTHESE, v.198, no.11, pp.10513 - 10528
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- Ever since Elga presented his famous puzzle of Sleeping Beauty, philosophers have debated between the Thirder and the Halfer positions. In his recent article, Daniel Singer proposes a new position, according to which Beauty ought to assign [0, 1/2] to (H) the coin's landing heads. For this argument, he exploits the similarity between Elga's original puzzle and Bovens's modified one. According to Singer, Beauty ought to assign the same credence to H (at the relevant moments) in both versions of Sleeping Beauty. Since Beauty ought to assign [0, 1/2] to H in Bovens's version, she ought to assign [0, 1/2] to H in Elga's original version, too. Let us call this "the Impreciser view." In this paper, I will contend that Singer's argument fails. First, he depends on false assumptions in defending his Impreciser view. Second, Bovens's version of Sleeping Beauty turns out to be underdescribed in an important aspect. If we try to provide a fuller description for it, either Beauty does not have to assign [0, 1/2] to H or the thus complemented version of Bovens's puzzle will fail to be analogous with Elga's original one. In either case, Singer's discussion does not establish his Impreciser view.
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