욕망과 법 논리Desire and Legal Logic
- Other Titles
- Desire and Legal Logic
- Authors
- 엄순영
- Issue Date
- 2010
- Publisher
- 법과사회이론학회
- Keywords
- desire; logic; syllogism; jurisprudence; legal logic; reason; methodology; legal argumentation; 욕망; 논리; 삼단논법; 법학; 법 논리; 이성; 방법론; 법적 논증
- Citation
- 법과사회, no.39, pp 213 - 235
- Pages
- 23
- Indexed
- KCI
- Journal Title
- 법과사회
- Number
- 39
- Start Page
- 213
- End Page
- 235
- URI
- https://scholarworks.gnu.ac.kr/handle/sw.gnu/25421
- ISSN
- 1227-0954
- Abstract
- The contents of the major premise in legal logic base on one’s values connected with one’s desires. At once the desire is an important factor of an act. As an act shapes the logic of judgement, it connects with the desires. Therefore it is to study desires that we need in Jurisprudence. So this paper studies the concept of desire in jurisprudence, and then how a desire can connect with legal logic.
In this essay, the desire includes the concepts of intentions, wills and wants in jurisprudence. Then the desire signifies wanting something. So it is suggested to separate the desire from its objects and its degrees. The something has a bracket and we can put everything in it. If we put reason in it, the desire shall be the Desire for Reason. In this way the desire is not opposed to a reason but comprehends it. Generally we say that the decision realizes rights. But in this view of desire we can say again that the decision realizes the desires recognized as rights. The desires arrange the index and contents of rights.
Through this view it is proposed that our desire for legal logic makes itself important also. In addition to this, our desires act in linking legal logic to reality. This our desire lets legal logic just. Therefore legal argument’s legitimacy about its contents has relation deeply with what and to some degree we want.
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Collections - 법과대학 > Department of Law > Journal Articles

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