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How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions?
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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lee, Eunsuh | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Kim, Chaehyun | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Lee, Junyoup | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-12-26T06:40:52Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-12-26T06:40:52Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-06 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1350-4851 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1466-4291 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.gnu.ac.kr/handle/sw.gnu/1172 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We investigate how powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) adopt antitakeover provisions (ATPs). Prior studies indicate that CEOs adopt ATPs to increase their private benefits and job security. However, our evidence reveals a nonmonotonic relationship between CEO power and ATPs. Specifically, relatively less powerful CEOs adopt more ATPs, supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. However, when CEOs become sufficiently powerful, they adopt fewer ATPs, supporting the quiet life hypothesis. Overall, our findings support the notion that a simple linear relationship does not explain the effect of CEO power. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 5 | - |
| dc.language | 영어 | - |
| dc.language.iso | ENG | - |
| dc.publisher | Chapman & Hall | - |
| dc.title | How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions? | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.publisher.location | 영국 | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/13504851.2021.1897510 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85102940378 | - |
| dc.identifier.wosid | 000630937500001 | - |
| dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Applied Economics Letters, v.29, no.10, pp 910 - 914 | - |
| dc.citation.title | Applied Economics Letters | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 29 | - |
| dc.citation.number | 10 | - |
| dc.citation.startPage | 910 | - |
| dc.citation.endPage | 914 | - |
| dc.type.docType | Article | - |
| dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
| dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
| dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
| dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
| dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Antitakeover provisions | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | CEO power | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Managerial entrenchment hypothesis | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Quiet life hypothesis | - |
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