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제조업체와 복수의 유통업체 간의 다자간 협상전략 분석
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | 조형래 | - |
| dc.contributor.author | 이민호 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-12-26T09:20:29Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-12-26T09:20:29Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-05 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1598-382X | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 2714-0016 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.gnu.ac.kr/handle/sw.gnu/2282 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Recently, distribution companies have shown market dominance that has grown so much that they have comparative advantagein negotiating delivery prices with manufacturers in some items. Considering the ever-growing market dominance of distributioncompanies, the question of how manufacturers should negotiate delivery prices with distribution companies is considered one ofthe important decisions made by manufacturers. In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells aproduct through multiple distribution companies with a difference in distribution market dominance and bargaining power with thecorresponding manufacturer. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequentialbargaining games. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) For the manufacturer, it is more advantageous to concludedelivery negotiations with both distribution companies than to sign a supply contract with a specific distributor and abandon therest; (2) If there is a difference in control of the distribution market between distribution companies, it is disadvantageous tomanufacturers, but it works in favor of distributors.; (3) Simultaneous negotiation method has always been found to beadvantageous to manufacturers' profits over sequential negotiation method; (4) If the manufactrure has to negotiate sequentially,the order of negotiations has a significant impact on manufacturer’s profit. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 9 | - |
| dc.language | 한국어 | - |
| dc.language.iso | KOR | - |
| dc.publisher | 한국SCM학회 | - |
| dc.title | 제조업체와 복수의 유통업체 간의 다자간 협상전략 분석 | - |
| dc.title.alternative | Strategic Analysis of Multilateral Bargaining Strategy between a Manufacturer and Distribution Companies | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.publisher.location | 대한민국 | - |
| dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | 한국SCM학회지, v.22, no.1, pp 1 - 9 | - |
| dc.citation.title | 한국SCM학회지 | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 22 | - |
| dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
| dc.citation.startPage | 1 | - |
| dc.citation.endPage | 9 | - |
| dc.identifier.kciid | ART002844287 | - |
| dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
| dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Multilateral bargaining | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Simultaneous bargaining | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Sequential bargaining | - |
| dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Nash equilibrium solution | - |
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